Sextus Empiricus PH I Glimpses of relativistic thinking were in evidence in Boethius — see Marenbon as well as in the double truth doctrine, or the view that religion and philosophy are separate and at times conflicting sources of truth, originally found in Averroes — and the 13 th century Latin Averroists.
However, the dominant belief in a singular and absolute revealed truth within a Christian framework, on the whole, made the medieval period inhospitable to relativism. There was a renewed interest in both relativism and skepticism at the inception of modern philosophy inspired, in part, by Latin translations of Sextus Empiricus in the 16 th century. His advocacy of toleration, even for the cannibal, paved the way for not only the acceptance but the valorization of idealized versions of alien creeds and distant cultures by Enlightenment figures such as Rousseau — , Voltaire — , Diderot — , Montesquieu — and Condorcet — , who in turn, were instrumental in establishing an intellectual climate hospitable to cultural relativism.
Diderot accordingly opposes the European mission of civilizing the natives, and despite his belief in a common human nature, he advocates the relativistic sounding maxim to. Put on the costume of the country you visit, but keep the suit of clothes you will need to go home in. Diderot []: in Baghramian Discussions of relativism in the 19 th century had two sources see Gardiner On the one hand, figures from the so-called Counter-Enlightenment, a philosophical movement which arose in the late 18 th century and the early 19 th century in opposition to the Enlightenment, Johann Georg Hamann — , Johann Gottfried Herder — , Wilhelm von Humboldt — emphasized the diversity of languages and customs and their role in shaping human thought.
Furthermore, the rules of rationality are embedded within language, which in turn, is governed by local norms of custom and use Hamann []. Relativism ensues because languages and their rules of rationality vary a great deal.
Herder, on the other hand, not only railed against the rational, universalizing and science-oriented ethos of the Enlightenment but, much like later relativists, also argued that different nations and epochs have their distinct preferences in ethical and aesthetics matters as well as their varied conceptions of truth and we are not in a position to adjudicate between them Herder [ —].
The Counter Enlightenment had a significant influence on Hegel, Nietzsche, and Dilthey, who in turn have shaped relativistic thinking in certain strands of continental philosophy, postmodernism and cultural studies. And indeed, Nietzsche is possibly the single most influential voice in shaping relativistic sensibilities in 20 th century continental philosophy. His declaration that all human conceptions and descriptions, including those advanced by scientists, are.
The end of the 19 th century witnessed the emergence of yet another strand of relativism motivated by empirical-psychological and physiological interpretations of Kantian categories. The view, known as species relativism , and defended by neo-Kantian psychologists such as Theodore Lipps — , holds that the rules of logic are products of the human mind and psychology and therefore may be unique to the human species; different species could have and use different logical principles.
Logic in this approach is identified with the actual thinking processes of individuals or communities and its authority is seen to be local, or relative to the practices of particular epistemic groupings.
But Frege and Husserl argued that with such relativization we would lose the ability to distinguish between reasoning correctly and merely seeming to do so.
Gilbert Harman is among the philosophers to use Einsteinian relativity as a model for philosophical versions of relativism. He says:. An object can have one mass in relation to one such framework and a different mass in relation to another. I am going to argue for a similar claim about moral right and wrong. Harman 3. It is however worth noting that Einstein did not think that the Theory of Relativity supported relativism in ethics or epistemology because, although in his model simultaneity and sameness of place are relative to reference frames, the physical laws expressing such relativity are constant and universal and hence in no sense relative.
The different strands of the intellectual genealogy of relativism have shaped a variety of relativistic doctrines. Relativism is discussed under a variety of headings some of which have been more prominent in recent philosophical and cultural debates. Public debates about relativism often revolve around the frequently cited but unclear notion of cultural relativism.
The idea that norms and values are born out of conventions can be traced back to the Greek historian Herodotus c. Franz Boas, responsible for the founding of social anthropology in the U. The data of ethnology prove that not only our knowledge but also our emotions are the result of the form of our social life and of the history of the people to whom we belong.
Boas Since those early days, social anthropologists have come to develop more nuanced approaches to cultural relativism see for instance Geertz ; however, its core tenet, a claim to the equal standing of all cultural perspectives and values which co-vary with their cultural and social background, has remained constant. Cultural relativists justify their position by recourse to a combination of empirical, conceptual and normative considerations:.
Claims a — d are open to a variety of objections. Some anthropologists and biologists have argued against the empirical assumption of the variability of cultures and have disputed its extent. Kinship, death and its attendant rituals of mourning, birth, the experience of empathy, expressions of sympathy and fear, and the biological needs that give rise to these, are some of the constant elements of human experience that belie the seeming diversity reported by ethnographers Brown Moreover, Moody-Adams , among others, has argued that cultures are not integrated wholes that could determine uni-directionally the beliefs and experiences of their members; they are porous, riddled with inconsistencies and amenable to change.
Finally, d is under pressure from the very relativism it advocates. An influential form of descriptive cultural relativism owes its genesis to linguistics. In the case of the Hopi, the claim was that their language imposes a conception of time very different from that of the speakers of the Indo-European languages. However, the empirical work by the psychologists Berlin and Key and later by Eleanor Rosch pointed to the universality of color terms.
The linguistic theories of Noam Chomsky regarding the universality of grammar were also widely taken to have discredited linguistic relativity. Similar claims have been made about emotions, object representation, and memory. Historical relativism, or historicism, is the diachronic version of cultural relativism. Historicism originated in reaction to the universalist tendencies of the Enlightenment but proved most influential in the social sciences, particularly in the hands of 19 th century theorists such as Karl Marx and Max Weber.
Karl Mannheim, to whom we owe the sub-discipline of sociology of knowledge, pronounced that historicism is a significant intellectual force that epitomizes our worldview Weltanschauung.
The historicist principle not only organizes, like an invisible hand, the work of the cultural sciences Geisteswissenschaften , but also permeates everyday thinking. Mannheim [] Conceptual relativism is a narrowly delineated form of relativism where ontology, or what exists, rather than ethical and epistemic norms, is relativized to conceptual schemes, scientific paradigms, or categorical frameworks. In this sense, conceptual relativism is often characterized as a metaphysical doctrine rather than as variant of epistemic or cultural relativism.
The underlying rationale for this form of relativism is the anti-realist thesis that the world does not present itself to us ready-made or ready-carved; rather we supply different, and at times incompatible, ways of categorizing and conceptualizing it. Reflection on the connections between mind and the world, rather than empirical observations of historic and cultural diversity, is the primary engine driving various forms of conceptual relativism, but data from anthropology and linguistics are also used in its support.
The conceptual relativist adds, as Kant did not, that human beings may construct the real in different ways thanks to differences in language or culture.
In the 20 th century, a variety of positions sympathetic to conceptual relativism were developed. But his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation makes the stronger claim that different incompatible manuals of translation, or conceptual schemes, can account for one and the same verbal behavior and the indeterminacy resides at the level of facts rather than our knowledge, a position that leads to unavoidable ontological relativity.
Sider According to Putnam, our most basic metaphysical categories, e. What counts as an object itself, he argues, is determined by and hence is relative to the ontological framework we opt for. The key difficulty facing conceptual relativism is that of formulating the position in a coherent but non-trivial manner.
Trivial versions allow that the world can be described in different ways, but make no claims to the incompatibility of these descriptions.
The charge of incoherence arises from the claim that there could be genuinely conflicting and equally true accounts or descriptions of one and the same phenomenon.
As Putnam puts it:. The suggestion … is that what is by commonsense standards the same situation can be described in many different ways, depending on how we use the words. Putnam The puzzle is to explain how both the Carnapian and mereological answers to the one and same question could be correct and yet mutually incompatible, for unless we abandon the most fundamental law of logic, the law of non-contradiction, we cannot deem one and the same proposition true and not true.
Relativists respond that both answers are correct, each relative to the conceptual scheme it invokes. So, once we accept the insight that there is no Archimedean vantage point for choosing among conflicting frameworks, we no longer face a genuine contradiction. The response invokes, often implicitly, a relativized conception of truth, which as we shall see below, faces its own difficulties.
Relativism about truth, or alethic relativism , at its simplest, is the claim that what is true for one individual or social group may not be true for another, and there is no context-independent vantage point to adjudicate the matter. What is true or false is always relative to a conceptual, cultural, or linguistic framework. For instance, relativism about logic may be restated as a view according to which the standing of logical truths including truths about consequence relations is relative to cultures or cognitive schemes.
Ethical relativism can be seen as the claim that the truth of ethical judgments, if such truths exist, is relative to context or culture.
If truth is to be seen as equally applicable to all areas of discourse and also unitary, rather than domain specific or plural, then alethic relativism is not only a strong form of global relativism but it also entails the denial of the possibility of more local forms of relativism because all localized relativistic claims are also attempts at relativizing truth seemingly in a particular domain of discourse.
For instance, should relative truth be understood as a modification on an already familiar strategy for thinking about truth e. MacFarlane ch. The strongest and most persistent charge leveled against all types of relativism, but global alethic relativism in particular, is the accusation of self-refutation.
Here is for instance Harvey Siegel:. This incoherence charge is by far the most difficult problem facing the relativist. It is worth noting that attempts to overcome the problem by appealing to the notion of relative truth appear not to succeed.
Many versions of relativism rely on such a notion, but it is very difficult to make sense of it. Siegel Therefore, Protagoras must believe that his own doctrine is false see Theaetetus : a—c.
On this view, Plato begs the question on behalf of an absolutist conception of truth Burnyeat a: Protagoras, the relativists counter, could indeed accept that his own doctrine is false for those who accept absolutism but continue believing that his doctrine is true for him.
He could also try to persuade others to become the sort of thinker for whom relativism is true without being entangled in self-contradiction. Such an effort at persuasions, however, could involve Protagoras in a performative contradiction as the relativist cannot assume that her arguments are good for persuading others.
Ordinarily, the very act of defending a philosophical position commits us to the dialectical move of attempting to convince our interlocutors of the superior value of what we are arguing for. The relativist cannot make such a commitment and therefore his attempts to persuade others to accept his position may be pragmatically self-refuting.
The relativist can avoid the standard charge of self-refutation by accepting that relativism cannot be proven true in any non-relative sense— viz. In other words, if Protagoras really believes in relativism why would he bother to argue for it?
This form of alethic relativism allows for argument and persuasion among people who initially disagree, for despite their disagreement they may share or come to share a framework. Protagoras may, on this reinterpretation, be trying to persuade his interlocutor that if she were to reason cogently by her own standards from their shared framework, she would accept relativism.
However, it is not clear how the relativist could share a framework with the absolutist on the nature of truth or what argumentative strategies he can use to convert the absolutist without presupposing a shared relativist or absolutist conceptions of truth. A second strand of the self-refutation argument focuses on the nature and role of truth. But the relativists reject the quick move that presupposes the very conception of truth they are at pains to undermine and have offered sophisticated approaches of defense.
Shogenji for a criticism of Hales on this point. It has also been claimed that alethic relativism gives rise to what J. One version of the argument, advanced most notably by Gareth Evans —63 , begins with the premise that a publicly shared distinction between correct and incorrect, and hence true and false, assertion is a necessary condition for coherent assertoric discourse.
As Evans puts it, a theory that. What should we aim at, or take others to be aiming at?. And if truth is relative, then there is no single shared definite aim for any given assertion see MacFarlane ch. The relativists however, could respond that truth is relative to a group conceptual scheme, framework and they take speakers to be aiming a truth relative to the scheme that they and their interlocutors are presumed to share. The difficulty with this approach is that it seems to make communication across frameworks impossible.
Such a response, however, will be answerable to the charge of incoherence raised by Donald Davidson against both alethic and conceptual relativism. According to Davidson, the principle of charity—the assumption that other speakers by and large speak truly by our lights —is a pre-requisite of all interpretation. He takes this to imply that there could not be languages or conceptual schemes that we cannot in principle understand and interpret, in other words, if a system of signs L is not recognizable as a language by us then L is not a language.
Languages are either inter-translatable and hence not radically different from ours, or incommensurable and beyond our ability to recognize them as languages Davidson The relativist, in effect, places other speakers and their languages beyond our recognitional reach and thereby undermines the initial claim that they could be radically different or incommensurable.
Claims to knowledge and justification have proven receptive to relativistic interpretations. Epistemic relativism is the thesis that cognitive norms that determine what counts as knowledge, or whether a belief is rational, justifiable, etc. The three key assumptions underlying epistemic relativism are:. One crucial question facing epistemic relativism is how to identify and individuate alternative epistemic systems.
A simple and quite commonly used example is the contrast between scientific and religious belief systems. Boghossian has been criticized however for his characterization of epistemic relativism. And on this basis, Boghossian concludes that there is no coherent way to formulate the position because the relativist in formulating his position and setting up the opposition between two or more alternative non-convergent epistemic systems cannot but assume the universality of at least some epistemic principles, including deduction, induction, warrant through empirical evidence, etc.
Wright , our italics. Moreover, Wright argues, the epistemic relationist clause Boghossian includes in the kind of epistemic relativism he challenges betrays a failure to distinguish between i making a judgment in the light of certain standards and ii judging that those standards mandate that judgment.
Conceptions of rationality, and its key components of logic and justification, are some of the principles that are often used to differentiate between epistemic systems. Below we look at attempts at relativizing each. Earlier defenses of epistemic relativism centered on the idea of alternative rationalities and were often developed as a reaction to the charge of irrationality leveled at non-Western tribal people.
Rationality traditionally is seen as a cognitive virtue as well as a hallmark of the scientific method. The complex notion of rationality is intimately tied to requirements of consistency, justification, warrant and evidence for beliefs. Relativists about rationality cast doubt on the universal applicability of one or more of these features of rational thought, and deem them merely local epistemic values. Winch had argued that since standards of rationality in different societies do not always coincide, we should use only contextually and internally given criteria of rationality in our assessment of the systems of belief of other cultures and societies.
Under the influence of the later Wittgenstein, he maintained that it does not make sense to speak of a universal standard of rationality because what is rational is decided by a backdrop of norms governing a given language and form of life. As outside observers, we are not in a position to impute irrationality or illogicality to the Azande or any other group whose practices and language-games may differ from ours.
They, thereby, conclude that an all-out or strong relativism about rationality is not tenable. The weaker claim is that some elements of rationality, for instance what counts as good evidence or a better style of reasoning, could vary with historic conditions and traditions of enquiry and therefore a degree of relativization of such norms, without succumbing to irrationalism, is acceptable see Hacking and MacIntyre Epistemic relativists maintain that the legitimacy of a justificatory system and the presumed strength of epistemic warrants are decided locally.
Richard Rorty has made the influential claim that. Rorty Debates about the scope and authority of logic are also focal to discussions of rationality. Barry Barnes and David Bloor, for instance, have argued that different societies may have incompatible but internally coherent systems of logic because validity and rules of inference are defined by, and hence are relative to, the practices of a given community, rather than a priori universal restrictions on all thought.
According to Bloor,. The Azande have the same psychology as us but radically different institutions. If we relate logic to the psychology of reasoning we shall be inclined to say that they have the same logic; if we relate logic more closely to the institutional framework of thought then we shall incline to the view that the two cultures have different logics.
Bloor — The Azande, according to Evans-Prichard, believe that it is possible to identify a witch by examining the contents of his intestine through the use of a poison oracle. They also believe that Witchhood is inherited patrilineally. Since the Azande clan members are related to each other through the male line, it follows that if one person is shown to be a witch, then all the members of his clan must also be witches. Evans-Pritchard tells us that although the Azande see the sense of this argument they do not accept the conclusion; they seem to side-step the contradiction in their belief-system.
Relativistically inclined commentators have argued that the Azande both do and do not contradict themselves depending on, or relative to, the culture that is being taken as the vantage point Bloor and Jennings See Seidel for a sustained critique. More recently, Peng and Nisbett, using experimental data, have argued that Chinese and American students have different attitudes towards the Law of Non-Contradiction. In his The Geography of Thought , Nisbett has generalized his results to claim that Asian and European structures of thinking, including perception and conceptualization, differ significantly.
Their approach attempts to naturalize logic by tying it to actual practices of the human subjects. The relativistically inclined, however, argue that to think of logic as singular, a priori, and universal speaks of a philosophical prejudice and does not sit well with a naturalistic and scientific attitude. A different line of support for relativism about logic starts with pluralism about logic, the view that there can be a multitude of correct but not fully compatible conceptions of logic where differing accounts of logical consequence, logical connectives or even validity are on offer.
Relativism ensues if we also assume that there is no neutral framework for adjudicating between the differing accounts. What counts as a correct account of logical consequence and validity or even the choice of logical vocabulary are relative to the system of logic that embed and justify these accounts and choices. See Steinberger for a useful survey. Stewart Shapiro is probably the most vocal defender of this approach.
His argument for relativism about logic is similar to defences of relativism in other areas where intractable differences in a particular domain and an inability to reconcile them are used as the motivators for relativism. The claim is that there are different conceptions of logical consequence. Therefore, it does not make sense to think that there is a uniquely correct conception of validity and logical consequence.
Notify me of new posts via email. Email Address:. Ramblings of a Psychology Student. Skip to content. Home About Me. Rationalism vs. Share this: Twitter Facebook. Like this: Like Loading April 23, at pm. Leave a Reply Cancel reply Enter your comment here Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:. Email required Address never made public. This section takes as a starting point two such connections: namely, connections between propositional knowledge and i evidence; and ii knowledge-how for a more detailed discussion, see Carter Firstly, evidence.
The resulting tension would be untenable at best , at worst, contradictory. As Stanley puts it:. But you know in what way you could ride a bicycle if and only if you possess some propositional knowledge, viz. Again, the resulting tension would be untenable at best , at worst, contradictory. What the foregoing brief consideration of evidence and knowledge-how indicates is that, at least for those with certain substantive commitments in epistemology where epistemic standings other than knowledge are either identified with or in some way reduced to a kind of propositional knowledge, an extension of an assessment-sensitive semantics to these standings as well looks potentially unavoidable.
See Carter ; , Ch. In short, if the moral ought gets a relativist treatment, it is hard to see how the epistemic ought would not likewise. For example, if whether one ought to believe something is a relative matter, then plausibly, whether one is justified in believing something is a relative matter. Likewise, if epistemic oughts are relative, then presumably so will the epistemic norms which generate epistemic oughts.
Participants in the functional turn in epistemology appeal to practical explications of the concept of knowledge, on the basis of which they identify a function, where that function is regarded as generating an ex ante constraint on an analysis of knowledge or a semantics of knowledge attributions. For Krista Lawlor the relevant function is identified a la Austin as that of providing assurance. This is an open question for future research. If the ordinary concept of knowledge, however, requires a relativist treatment, then this presses the complicated issue of whether the ordinary concept of knowledge and the concept of interest to epistemologists are the same, and even more generally just how knowledge attributions should inform the theory of knowledge.
Adam Carter Email: jadamcarter gmail. Epistemology and Relativism Epistemology is, roughly, the philosophical theory of knowledge, its nature and scope.
Edmund does not know that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Knowledge is not factorable into component parts. Beliefs formed on the basis of direct observation are better justified than beliefs formed on the basis of drug-induced wishful thinking.
Epistemic relationism There are many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epistemic systems, but no facts by virtue of which one of these systems is more correct than any of the others. As he puts it: […] the relativist urges, we must reform our talk so that we no longer speak simply about what is justified by the evidence, but only about what is justified by the evidence according to the particular epistemic system that we happen to accept, noting, all the while, that there are no facts by virtue of which our particular system is more correct than any of the others.
But this , Wright says: […] is just to fail to take seriously the thesis that claims such as [ sic … S is justified in believing X] can indeed be true or false , albeit, only relatively so. Traditional Arguments for Epistemic Relativism: The Pyrrhonian Argument One influential argument strategy under the banner of epistemic relativism takes as a starting point a famous philosophical puzzle traditionally associated with Pyrrhonian skepticism — that is to say, the Pyrrhonian problematic.
Traditional Arguments for Epistemic Relativism: Non-Neutrality Another kind of argument for traditional epistemic relativism is what Harvey Siegel has termed the non-neutrality argument. In the context of the dispute between Galileo and Bellarmine, no such metanorm is available. Therefore, it is not the case that there can be a non-relative resolution of the dispute concerning the existence of the moons.
Therefore, epistemic relativism is true. Traditional Arguments for Epistemic Relativism: Incommensurability and Circularity A third kind of argument which has motivated versions of epistemic relativism appeals to incommensurability and epistemic circularity. Michael Williams expresses the idea on behalf of the relativist as follows: In determining whether a belief—any belief—is justified, we always rely, implicitly or explicitly, on an epistemic framework: some standards or procedures that separate justified from unjustified convictions.
MacFarlane articulates the form of the conundrum-argument as follows: i p obviously entails q. What about premise 2? Premise 2 of the master argument, recall, says that: 2 Relativism preserves the advantages while avoiding the disadvantages.
As Stanley puts it: […] you know how to ride a bicycle if and only if you know in what way you could ride a bicycle. References and Further Reading Baghramian, Maria. London: Routledge, Baghramian, Maria. The Many Faces of Relativism. Baghramian, Maria and Carter, J. Boghossian, Paul.
Fear of Knowledge: against Relativism and Constructivism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Carter, J. Metaepistemology and Relativism. Palgrave Macmillan, S1 February : — Ichikawa ed. Routledge Handbook of Contextualism , , London: Routledge. Chrisman, Matthew. Cohen, Stewart. Craig, Edward. Oxford University Press, Cuneo, Terence.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, DeRose, Keith. The Case for Contextualism. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, Derose, Keith. Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Egan, Andy. Gerken, M. This additional evidence may have led Bellarmine to boost the standing of Revelation to a position as strong as any fundamental principle.
Objection number three continues with the Wittgensteinian theme. Boghossian and Seidel employ a strict separation of norms and beliefs, arguing that a difference merely in belief is not enough for a fundamental difference of epistemic systems. Fundamental beliefs of the certainty variety are no less central to epistemic systems than are norms of the kind cited above.
My fourth objection is directed at the alleged intuitiveness of Derive and Instance. Think for instance of the Chemical Revolution, a case that has recently received a detailed relativist reconstruction Chang What would be the fundamental underived general epistemic principle on which Priestley and Lavoisier disagreed?
Finally, and in light of this last comment, it seems to me that we need better criteria for judging that two epistemic systems differ in a principled and intractable way. A string of philosophers have suggested that we have fundamentally different systems when a conversion is needed Wittgenstein ; Kuhn ; Williams ; Van Fraassen I have discussed one important element in epistemic relativism, No-metajustification, that is, the idea that it is impossible to show in a neutral, non-question-begging, way that one epistemic system is epistemically superior to all others.
I have focused on two attempts to attack this idea: one of these attempts centred on the relativist uses of the Problem of the Criterion, the other on the claim that there are genuine alternative epistemic systems.
I have also attempted to show that the existing arguments against the possibility of genuine alternative epistemic systems are not compelling. I have taken my starting point from authors—Sankey, Seidel, Boghossian—who argue against No-metajustification. This is based on the conviction that the best way to make progress in making sense of relativism is to try to dismantle, one by one, the myriad of prima facie compelling arguments against it.
This paper is only a very small part of this broader project. Alston, W. Epistemic circularity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 47 1 , 1— Article Google Scholar. Perceiving god: The epistemology of religious experience. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Google Scholar. The reliability of sense perception.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Barnes, B. Natural rationality: A neglected concept in the social sciences. Science , , — Bergmann, M. Epistemic circularity: Malignant and benign. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 69 3 , — Boghossian, P. Fear of knowledge: Against relativism and constructivism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Book Google Scholar. Brandom, R. Articulating reasons: An introduction to inferentialism.
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Collins, H. Epistemological chicken. Pickering Ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Evans-Pritchard, E. Witchcraft, oracles and magic among the Azande. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Geertz, C. Local Knowledge: Further essays in interpretive anthropology. New York: Basic Books. Goldman, A. Knowledge in a social world. Kuhn, T. The structure of scientific revolutions.
Kusch, M. Boghossian on epistemological and moral relativism: A Critique. Download September 4th, , 3p. Leeson, P. Rationality and Society , 26 2 , — Luper, S. Epistemic relativism. Issues , 14 , — Moyal-Sharrock, D. Pritchard, D. Defusing epistemic relativism. Synthese , 2 , — Epistemic angst: Radical skepticism and the groundlessness of our believing. Rosen, G. Nominalism, naturalism, epistemic relativism. Philosophical Perspectives , 15 , 69— Sankey, H.
Witchcraft, relativism and the problem of the criterion. Erkenntnis , 72 , 1— Epistemic relativism and the problem of the criterion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, A , 42 4 , — Scepticism, relativism and the argument from the criterion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, A , 43 1 , — Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, A , 44 1 , — On relativism and pluralism: Response to Steven Bland.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science , A47 3 , 98— Relativism, particularism and reflective equilibrium. Seidel, M. A comment on Sankey. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science , A 44 1 , — Epistemic relativism: A constructive critique. Sosa, E. Philosophical scepticism and epistemic circularity. Aristotelian Society Supplementary , 68 , — Reflective knowledge in the best circles. Journal of Philosophy , 94 8 , — Van Fraassen, B. The empirical stance the terry lectures series.
New York: Yale University Press. Williams, B. The truth in relativism. Williams Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter Google Scholar. Williams, M. Why Wittgensteinian contextualism is not relativism.
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